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The successful export strategies of some 
South-East Asian countries have been raised in 
certain Latin American circles to the level of 
veritable paradigms and it is held that our re-
gion should imitate these processes in order to 
achieve high rates of growth of production, 
employment, productivity and even real re-
muneration. For this reason, it is of particular 
interest to analyse the policies, institutional 
machinery, and domestic and international so-
cial and political conditions within the frame-
work of which these cases have taken place. 
The present article analyses some aspects 
of these processes which show the complexity, 
richness and heterogeneity that characterize 
them and which make it clear that the lessons 
that can be drawn from them while richer and 
more valuable than those deriving from the 
'popular' version generally disseminated in 
Latin America, do not permit their imitative 
application in this region. 
After the Introduction, section H of the 
article gives a brief description of the main 
economic parameters of the four countries in 
question —South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Section III examines the rela-
tionship between the export and industrializa-
tion policies, section IV raises some aspects of 
protectionist and import substitution policy, 
section V analyses the role which the State has 
played in these strategies, and the last section 
of the article sets these examples against the 
international context in which they have oc-
curred. 




In the rapid industrialization which has taken 
place since the war, special attention is war-
ranted by the export-led industrialization ex-
per ience not only of Japan, to which numerous 
references were made in a previous study,* but 
also of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, firstly because of the impressive 
rates of growth and transformation of the struc-
ture of production which these countries have 
achieved in a brief space of time, and secondly, 
because the success achieved by them has been 
generating the belief that the experience of 
these countries forms an example which could 
and should inspire the future industrial growth 
of Latin America. 
The view is frequently expressed in cer-
tain circles in Latin America that the success of 
these processes is due firstly to their total 
openness to international trade, and secondly 
to the very low level of public, intervention. In 
coming to this conclusion, a complex set of dif-
ferent experiences is thus reduced to a conclu-
sion of a normative nature whereby the coun-
tries of Latin America need only eliminate their 
protectionist schemes and reduce public inter-
vention to its smallest possible expression in 
order to permit the generation of successful 
export models comparable to those of South-
East Asia. 
As we propose to show in this study, the 
mystification implicit in this version of what 
has happened in the "Newly Industrialized 
Countr ies" (NICs) of Asia is particularly seri-
ous for two reasons. Firstly, because it prevents 
us from advancing in our understanding of the 
factors which really explain these rates of 
growth and change, thus losing the opportunity 
of taking advantage of experiences which are 
undoubtedly valuable both in the fields of poli-
cy and of institutional machinery. Secondly, 
because not only are recommendations made 
which correspond only to a limited extent to the 
*Fernando Fajnzylber, The Industrial Dynamic in 
Advanced Economies and in Semi-industrialized Coun-
tries, Pacific Trade and Development Conference, 1980, 
Seoul, Korea, 1-4 September 1980. 
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experiences from which they are supposed to 
derive, bu t also it is extremely open to question 
—even leaving aside the political conditioning 
factors— whether their application to Latin 
America in the manner suggested could gener-
ate results comparable to those observed in the 
p resumed source of inspiration of these recom-
mendat ions. 
For this reason an endeavour will be made 
in the following paragraphs, although admit-
tedly in a rather sketchy and incomplete man-
ner, to analyse some specific aspects of these 
forms of experience which show the enormous 
complexity, richness and heterogeneity charac-
terizing them and make it clear that the lessons 
Among the four countries considered, it is 
worth making a distinction between the cases 
of Hong Kong and Singapore and those of Korea 
and Taiwan. The first two are city-States with 
an area of 1 000 km2, a per capita income of over 
US$ 2 000, —practically no agriculture (2% of 
the gross product), and a particularly well de-
veloped services, commerce and finance sec-
tor. The population of Hong Kong is 4.5 million 
persons, while that of Singapore is 2.3 million. 
T h e character of international trading centres 
which has historically been associated with 
these city-States is clear when one considers 
the ratio of international trade to the product, 
which comes to 183% and 252% in Hong Kong 
and Singapore, respectively. These city-states, 
with a population density of over 2 000 inhabi-
tants per km2 and almost completely without 
agriculture must not be analysed using the 
same patterns as for the other two South-East 
Asian countries, Korea and Taiwan, which have 
characteristics comparable to those of the rest 
of the developing world. Although Korea and 
Taiwan are geographically small, with areas of 
99 000 km2 and 36 000 km2 and populations of 
36 million and 16 million respectively, and 
with a domestic product which in 1976 was 
around US$ 1 000 per person (US$ 670 in Korea 
a n d U S $ 1 070 in Taiwan), the proportion of the 
which can be drawn from them are undoubted-
ly richer and more valuable than those stem-
ming from the 'popular' version so widely dis-
semitated in the region. 
First of all, a very brief description of the 
main economic parameters of the four countries 
in question will be given, followed by an ex-
amination of the relationship between export 
policy and industrialization policy. Next, as-
pects of protectionist policy will be discussed, 
followed by an examination of the role of the 
State in these models, and finally the interna-
tional context in which these forms of expe-
rience took place will be examined. 
product generated in the agricultural sector in 
these countries was higher, for example, than 
in the cases of Mexico and Brazil, for in Korea it 
was 27% and in Taiwan 12%, while in Brazil it 
was only 8% and in Mexico 10%. These com-
parisons with Mexico and Brazil are düe to the 
fact that recent O E C D studies include these 
two countries as the only Latin American rep-
resentatives of the special group of NICs. 
What these four Asian countries do have in 
common is undoubtedly the very rapid growth 
of the industrial product, output and exports. 
In terms of per capita income, the four 
countries display a significant growth rate 
which has enabled them to shorten the distance 
be tween themselves and the United States, if 
the latter country is taken as a reference. 
In the case of the city-States, their per 
capita income in 1963 was 23% of that of the 
United States in the case of Singapore and 20% 
in the case of Hong Kong, whereas in 1976 
Singapore had risen to a level equivalent to 
42% of the United States per capita income and 
Hong Kong had reached the level of 35%, the 
figure for Singapore being comparable to that 
of Argentina and Spain, and that for Hong Kong 
being significantly higher than that of Brazil, 
although in 1963 the level had been very simi-
lar to that of the latter country. Significant 
II 
General background description 
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relative growth is also to be observed in the 
case of the 'normal' countries of Korea and 
Taiwan, although starting from lower levels: in 
1963 Korea had a per capita income equal to 9% 
that of the United states, rising to 20% by 1976, 
while in Taiwan the increase was from 14% in 
1963 to 24% in 1976. In both cases, these levels 
of per capita income were lower than those of 
Brazil and Mexico. 
As regards industrial output, and consid-
ering exclusively the market economies, it may 
be noted that in 1963 the industrial output of 
these four countries was equivalent to 0.35% of 
A basic but frequently overlooked element in 
the strategies followed by these countries is 
their fundamental choice of industrialization: 
industrialization aimed at penetrating interna-
tional markets, perhaps, but industrialization 
nevertheless. The sustained and persistent 
dynamic effects which these strategies had in 
terms of the generation of employment, raising 
of the level of the skill of the labour force, 
increased productivity, higher real wages, and 
generation of consensus regarding the impor-
tance of technical progress are intrinsically 
linked with the basic fact that these countries' 
exports were industrial products. If the volume 
of foreign exchange generated by these strate-
gies had originated in the export of natural 
resources, which in any case these countries 
lacked, it is very doubtful whether the sus-
tained effects mentioned above would have 
been comparable. Consequently, it is not the 
orientation towards exports per se which 
generates these dynamic effects, but rather the 
basic fact that the products exported, even 
though involving a high content of imported 
inputs, are the subject of local processing 
which leads to the incorporation and dissemi-
nation of the 'industrial outlook' into the local 
patrimony. 
The following illustrate the magnitude of 
the process of change experienced by these 
economies as a result of the leading role played 
the industrial output of the market economies 
as a whole, while by 1976 it had risen to 1.35%. 
Over the same period, the share of Brazil and 
Mexico rose from 2.6% in 1963 to 3.9% in 1976.1 
The interesting feature of this industrial 
growth is the fact that it was accompanied by an 
impressive expansion of industrial exports, re-
flected in the increase in the share of the ex-
ports of manufactures of these four countries 
within the world total2 from 1.35% in 1963 to 
4.0% in 1976. Over the same period, the share 
of the industrial exports of Brazil and Mexico 
increased from 0.22% in 1963 to 0.92% in 1976. 
by the impressive industrial growth which 
characterizes their experience. 
In the case of Korea, the product of the 
industrial sector represented only 5% of the 
national product in 1954 (see table 1). In 1978, 
however, 24 years later, the share of the indus-
trial sector had risen to 32%, while that of the 
primary sector had gone from 50% to 19%. 
In Taiwan, the industrial sector accounted 
for 10% of the product in 1952, whereas this 
proportion had risen by 1979 to the impressive 
level of 42%, while primary production went 
down from 37% to 11% over the same period 
(see table 2). 
In the city-State of Singapore, which has 
practically no agriculture, the industrial sector 
represented 13% of the products in 1960 but 
24% by 1979. This change was due partly to a 
relative decrease in the role of the primary 
sector from 5% in 1960 to 2% in 1979, but to a 
larger extent it was due to the relative decrease 
in the role of the services sector, which was 
responsible for 79% of the product in 1960 but 
only 70% in 1979. The relative weight of the 
services sector reflects the special character-
istics of this international trading and distribu-
tion centre, as in the case of Hong Kong, thus 
'OECD, The Impact of Newly Industrialized Coun-
tries, 1979. 
Hhid. 
I l l 
Industrialization and export strategies 
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Table 1 
SOUTH KOREA: SECTORAL STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION 


























Source: Chong Hvun Nam, Trade and Industrial Policies and. the Structure of Protection in Korea, Korea Development 
Institute, 1980, p. 6. 
Table 2 
TAIWAN: SECTORAL STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION 










































Source: Kwo-Shu Liang and Ching-ing Hore Liang, Trade Strategy and the Exchange Rate Policies of Taiwan, National 
Taiwan University and National Chengchi University of Taiwan, 1980, p. 40. 
calling for a different form of analytical treat-
ment from that applied to the rest of the devel-
oping countries (see table 3). 
We can see, then, that the notable dynamism 
displayed by the economies of these countries 
in the period after the war cannot be separated 
from the explosive industrialization reflected 
in the foregoing figures, so that it is of particular 
importance to go more deeply into the special 
features of this industrialization process. A cen-
tral feature of this is the concentration of these 
countries on the export of consumer goods with 
a high import content and the relatively inten-
sive use of labour. In the case of Korea, where 
perhaps the most advanced stage of industrial-
ization has been reached, it may be noted, when 
comparing exports and imports of industrial 
goods, that the consumer goods category gen-
erates a significant trade surplus (almost US$ 6 
billion in 1978), but this is not enought even to 
offset the imports of intermediate goods, in-
cluding fuels, while a further deficit of US$ 
2 400 million is generated in the capital goods 
sector {see table 4). 
It is important to stress, however, that this 
export strategy involving a high import content, 
together with the growth of the domestic market 
and its consequent import requirements, ex-
plain why the trade balance of Korea shows a 
systematic deficit from 1960 to 1979. It is worth 
noting that between 1960 and 1973 the expan-
sion of domestic demand accounted for 73% of 
the overall growth of the industrial sector.3 This 
structural deficit in the trade balance points to 
the importance of external financing, particu-
larly in the 1960s : a subject which will be refer-
red to later. 
If we compare the relative size of the defi-
cit with the volume of exports, we see that there 
has been a significant improvement, because 
3Larry E. Westphal, "The Republic of Korea's Expe-
rience with Export-Led Industrial Development", World 
Development, Vol. 6, No. 3,1978, table 12, p. 366. 
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Table 3 
SINGAPORE: SECTORAL STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION 
Share in G D P (%) 1960 1973 1979 
























Source: WongKum-Poh, The Financing of'Trade and Development in the ADCs: The Experience ofSingapore, University 
of Singapore, 1980, p. 6. 
Table 4 
SOUTH KOREA: NET EXPORTS, BY CATEGORIES 
(Thousands of dollars) 





-545 610 -727 097 -1152 465 -1165 385 -701690 -1262 903 -2 412 348 
-1059 929 -1651585 -3 005114 -3 425 210 -3 931559 -4 491754 -5 770 009 
699 342 1 339 795 1 761 930 2 376 891 3 506 336 4 657 036 5 691 961 
-897 914 -1015252 -2 391478 -2193 418 1058 523 -764 081 -2 249 814 
Source: Toshio Watanabe, An Analysis of Structural Dependence Between the Republic of Korea and Japan: Toward a 
More Optimal Division of Labour, University of'Tsukuba, Japan, 1980, p. 11. 
whereas in the 1960s the deficit was of a com-
parable order of magnitude to the exports of 
goods and services, from 1972 the proportion 
wen t down to 40%, and in the period 1976-1978 
it amounted to only 6%.4 
Concentration on the export of consumer 
goods and high import content are well-known 
features of this group of Asian countries, but 
something which is not so often mentioned is 
their particular kind of link with Japan, with 
which they have a relationship clearly different 
from that which they have established with the 
Uni ted States and Europe. Thus, concentrating 
once again on the case of Korea, we note that 
whereas these countries' exports penetrate suc-
cessfully into markets of the United States and 
Europe and generate a trade surplus favourable 
for the exporting countries, there is a signif-
icant (and in the case of Korea, growing) trade 
deficit with Japan. In 1970 Korea's deficit with 
Japan was US$ 589 million, but in 1978 it 
amounted to US$ 3 412 million, equivalent to 
practically twice Korea's total trade deficit in 
that year and equal to 6% of its gross national 
p roduc t 5 
If we analyse the structure of the trade 
relations between the two countries in ques-
tion, we see that Japan has a favourable trade 
balance in the categories of machinery (22), 
electrical and electronic equipment (23), 
transport equipment (24), basic metals (19) and 
chemical products (14), while the trade balance 
is favourable to Korea in the branches of texti-
4See Park Yung-Chul, Export Growth and the Balance 
of Payments in Korea 1960-1978, Korea University, 1980, p. 
6. 
5Toshio Watanabe, An Analysis of Structural Depen-
dence Between the Republic of Korea and Japan, Universi-
ty of Tsukuba, Japan 1980. p. 7. Pacific Trade and Devel-
opment Conference, 1-4 September 1980, Seoul, Korea. 
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les (9), foodstuffs (5) and yarns and threads (8). 
Textile products, together with yarns and 
threads, represent 57% of Korea's exports to 
Japan. 
Clear specialization is to be observed even 
in the trade relations within this branch, since 
Korea mainly exports clothing, silk products 
and cotton yarns, while importing capital- and 
technology-intensive products such as syn-
thetic fibres and garments made therefrom.6 
The second most importent branch of Korea's 
exports to Japan is that of electrical and elec-
tronic equipment, where a clear tendency to 
specialization connected with the 'technolog-
ical density' of these products is likewise to be 
observed. This branch includes household ap-
pliances, electronic components and electrical 
machinery and equipment, Korea's speciality 
being the export of such household appliances 
and goods as radios, television sets, watches 
and pocket calculators —all labour-intensive 
items. In the other two groups, the advantage is 
on the side of Japan. Even within the branch of 
electronic components there is specialization, 
since Japan is a net importer of batteries and 
integrated circuits —for which the production 
technology is well known— while it exports 
semi-conductors. 
In the case of this sector, the specialization 
reflects the fact that the Korean enterprises en-
gaged in these lines were developed on the 
initiative of Japanese or United States enter-
prises seeking to take advantage of the lower 
cost of labour through subcontracting. This is 
refelcted in the high coefficients of exports and 
imports characterizing this branch in Korea: 
the export coefficient rose from 50% to 63% 
between 1970 and 1977, while the import coef-
ficient remained practically constant at around 
61% over the same period.7 The magnitude of 
Hhid, pp . 4-8. 
nbid. 
the presence of foreign firms in this sector is not 
typical of the industrial structure of Korea, for 
whereas in manufacturing as a whole foreign 
enterprises are estimated to be responsible for 
15% of the total exports, in the case of the elec-
tronic sector it is estimated that if subsidiaries, 
joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned sub-
sidiaries are included these account for 54% of 
the production and 72% of the exports.8 
There are indications that similar vertical 
links exist between Japan and the remaining 
Asian NICs, although in the case of these other 
countries the coefficients of horizontal special-
ization are estimated to be lower.9 This special 
linkage between the Asian NICs and Japan is of 
particular importance because it shows that, 
from Japan's point of view, the relative loss of 
markets in the United States and Europe caused 
by the new exports of labour-intensive prod-
ucts from these countries is offset by the indi-
rect exports of capital goods and intermediate 
products of Japanese origin incorporated in those 
countries' exports. The multiplier effect of 
Korea's exports for the Japanese economy has 
been worked out in quantitative terms, and this 
has confirmed the view that the net result is 
highly favourable for Japan.10 This situation 
would tend to change, however, in so far as 
these countries manage to progress in their 
production structure towards the metal manu-
factures and machinery and chemical branches, 
where they have indeed made significant steps 
forward. In the present circumstances of the 
world economy and those foreseeable in the 
short and medium term, however, it would ap-
pear that at least the speed of this diversifi-
cation is becoming less marked. 
&The Republic of Korea's Experience..., op. cit., p. 362. 
9An Analysis of Structural Dependence..., op. cit. 
mbid. 
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IV 
Selective import substitution policy 
Contrary to what is suggested by the 'popular' 
versions, the trade policy followed by these 
countries has included a by no means insignif-
icant import substitution component, and this, 
unlike what happened in Latin America, has 
had an extremely selective nature at the sec-
toral level which has been gradually changing 
with t ime and adapting itself to the modifica-
tions undergone by the sectoral priorities of 
industrial policy. This careful and selective 
protectionist policy used both tariff and non-
tarifT mechanisms, reinforcing both with mea-
sures regarding access to the foreign exchange 
market. The selectivity referred not only to the 
identification of sectors, but even to that of 
enterprises, the authorization of foreign ex-
change for imports being conditional upon the 
generation of exports incorporating those im-
ports, and thus involving the existence of in-
stitutional mechanisms permitting permanent 
communication between the government 
authorities and the respective enterprises. 
As we shall see later, this 'institutional' 
dimension, with differences of form and in-
tensity, is present in all four national cases and 
makes it clear that they involve an 'interven-
tionist ' State in the most orthodox Japanese tra-
dit ion. 
In the case of the protectionist policy of 
Korea, the first e lement which must be borne in 
mind is the fact that the information provided 
by the level of tariff protection is extremely 
sketchy, since "quantitative restrictions on im-
ports have been much more important than tariffs 
as ways of protecting import substitution in 
Korea".11 
In the course of the so-called 'import 
liberalization' which took place in 1967, a 
'black list' was introduced, whose effect was 
that all types of imports not listed there were 
automatically authorized. . The Government 
liTrade and Industriai Policies and the Structure of 
Protection in Korea, Chong Hyun Nam, Korea Develop-
men t Institute, 1980, p. 16. Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference, Seoul, 1980, 
announced the number of items corresponding 
to restricted imports, i.e., the black list, twice 
a year. The criteria for defining the items 
included in this black list were fundamentally 
the balance-of-payments situation and the 
requirements for protection of domestic indus-
tries. Quantitative restrictions were applied 
mainly to competitive and 'non-essential' or 
'luxury' imports, while imports of non-competi-
tive raw materials and intermediate goods were 
approved automatically. 
When the system of the 'black list' was 
adopted in 1967, approximately 60% of the 
1 312 basic import items (SITC four digits) 
were not included in the list and consequently 
received automatic approval; 118 items were 
totally prohibited, while 402 were subject to 
various types of restrictions such as quotas 
or requirements for recommendations from the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade or other 
ministries. Between 1967 and 1978, i.e., in the 
course of one decade, the items whose importa-
tion was prohibited were gradually transferred 
to the restricted import list, the proportion 
of the total number of items automatically 
authorized being maintained approximately 
constant. By 1977, the proportion of automa-
tically authorized items amounted to 52.7%, 
compared with 50.4% in 1967, and subsequen-
tly, towards the end of 1978, the proportion of 
automatically approved items rose to 64.9% 
(see table 5). In general terms, this shows that 
—at least from the point of view of the number 
of items of free or restricted importation— 
there were no substantial changes in the deca-
de following what was called 'import liberali-
zation process'. Consequently, in order to make 
a stricter appraisal of the nature of the protec-
tion system, it would be necessary to have in-
formation not only on the levels of tariff protec-
tion but also on the various import controls, and 
comparison of prices between the domestic 
and external markets. 
Table 6 shows the levels of effective pro-
tection for 1978 in comparison with those 
118 CEPAL REVIEW No. 15 / December 1981 
Table 5 
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Source: Chong Hvun Nam, Trade and Industrial Policies and the Structure of Protection in Korea, Korea Development 
Institute, 1980, p. 6. 
"The classification of imports of goods was based on the SITC 4-digit codes up to 1970, but after that the BTN (CCCN) 
4-digit codes were used. 
estimated for 1968 (the estimates of effective 
protection were obtained by using the methods 
of Balassa and Corden). This table brings out 
various interesting features of the Korean 
scheme of protectionist policy; to begin with, 
the weighted average rate of nominal protec-
tion for industrial activity as a whole rose from 
14% to 18% and the rate of effective protection 
from 11% to 3 1 % according to Balassa's method 
and from 9% to 24% according to Corden's 
method during the period 1968-1978. At the 
same time, the weighted average tariff protec-
tion went down from 54% to 38% over the same 
period. This points to the minor significance 
which tariff protection seems to have had in the 
case of Korea. 
Secondly, in the case of both nominal and 
effective protection, a larger inter-sectoral vari-
ation is observed in 1978 than in 1968, which 
suggests that the discriminatory nature of 
sectoral promotion policy has been heightened. 
Both nominal and effective protection tend to 
be smaller for intermediate goods and higher 
for capital goods and consumer durables. 
Thirdly, it is interesting to note that in the 
case of Korea —unlike what happened in Latin 
America— protection has a marked bias in 
favour of the agricultural sector, which has 
been intensified in the last decade. In 1968, the 
level of nominal protection for the agricultural 
sector was 17%, while it was 12% for the 
manufacturing sector; in 1978, in contrast, it 
had risen to 55% for the agricultural sector 
while it was only 10% for the manufacturing 
sector. This reflects, as in the case of Japan, the 
prevalence of the criterion of food self-suff'i-
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Table 6 
SOUTH KOREA: NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 
(Percentages) 
Legal tariff Nominal Effective protection for 
protection domestic sales 
Industry group 
1968 1978 1968 1978 Balassa Corden 
1968 1978 1968 1978 












Mining and energy 
Total primary production 
Processed foodstuffs 
Beverages and tobacco 
Construction materials 
Intermediate products I 
Intermediate products II 
Non-durable consumer goods 
Durable consumer goods 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Total manufacturing production 
Industry in general 
Primary production plus 
processed foodstuffs 
Manufacturing, excluding 
beverages and tobacco 
Manufacturing, excluding 
beverages, tobacco and 
processed foodstuffs 
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Source; Cliong Hvun Nam, Trade and industrial Policies and the Structure of protection in Korea, Korea Development 
Institute, 1980, p. 6. 
ciency in basic domestic consumer categories.12 
To sum up, then, in the words of Chong 
H yum Nam: 
"In the period 1968-1978, import 
liberalization seems to have been slow. Al-
though for industry as a whole the average legal 
tariff levels and the number of restricted import 
categories went down, the nominal level of 
protection rose slightly during this period".1'' 
It is evident that this state of affairs 
is very far from the drastic and immediate 
liberalization schemes currently recommended 
1 2See Kiyoshi Kojima, Japan and a New World 
Economic Order, Croom Helm, London, 1977, pp. 136-140, 
and S. Okita, "Japan, China and the United States: Eco-
nomic Relations and Prospects", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, 
No. 5, 1979. 
l 3 See Trade and Industrial..., op. cit., p. 35. 
in Latin America and actually put into practice 
by some countries, while it is also very far from 
the 'popular' version disseminated in Latin 
America regarding the trade policy of Korea. 
In the case of Taiwan the information avail-
able is less complete, but it is likewise clear 
that the process of liberalization of imports, 
although significantly more marked than in the 
case of Korea, is characterized by its gradual 
nature. Table 7 shows that between 1963 and 
1970 the percentage of items whose impor-
tation was controlled remained practically con-
stant: in 1953 over 36% of all items belonged to 
this category, while in 1976 this figure had 
risen to 41%. In other words, during the period 
in which the industrialization policy was being 
put into effect the ingredient of protection for 
local manufactures was clearly present: 
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Table 7 
TAIWAN: CHANGES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF VARIOUS 





































































































































Source: Kuo-Shu Liang and Ching-ing Hore Liang, Trade Strategy and the Exchange Rate Policies of Taiwan, National 
Taiwan University and National Chengchi University of'Taiwan, 1980, p. 40. 
"The principle whereby the domestic 
availability of a product justifies control of 
imports of similar goods is an important part of 
the Taiwan protection system, as in many other 
developing countries/ '1 4 
The basic criterion used was that local 
manufactures who desired protection must 
show that the quantity and quality of their 
products were sufficient to satisfy domestic 
demand and that the cost of the imported raw 
materials to manufacture such products locally 
did not exceed 70% of the total cost of produc-
tion. The ex-works price of the products whose 
importation was restricted could not exceed the 
prices of competing imports by more than 25% 
in 1960. In 1964 this margin was reduced to 
15%, in 1968 to 10%, and in 1973 to 5%. 
V 
The role of the state 
State action is present in all four of the coxintries 
analysed, although with differences of inten-
sity and involving different forms of interven-
tion. Even in the city States of Singapore and 
Hong Kong, historically conditioned to play a 
role as centres of international trade distribu-
tion, there are clear indications that the postwar 
14
 Kuo-Shu Liang and Ghing-ing Hore Liang. Trade 
Strategy and the Exchange Rate Policies of Taiwan, Na-
tional Taiwan University and, National Chengchi Univer-
sity, Taiwan. 1980, p. 14. Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference, Seoul, 1980. 
industrialization strategy was the result not 
only of the action of the international market 
forces, but of the adoption of a strategic de-
cision by articulated internal nuclei of the 
respective States: 
" In Singapore, the Government plays a 
key role in economic development. It not only 
identifies the sectors which display problems, 
formulates suitable policies and grants the 
necessary investment incentives, but also plays 
a real part in a wide range of economic activi-
ties... The public sector makes a considerable 
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contribution to capital formation. Of the total 
gross domestic capital formation it is respon-
sible for between a quarter and a third."15 
In Hong Kong the presence and action of 
the State reflect the existence of domestic 
entrepreneurial nuclei which have an histori-
cal component associated with the long period 
dur ing which this city-State has played a signifi-
cant role in international trade intermediation 
relations in Asia. This component, distilled 
over the space of more than a century, is 
accompanied by the contribution in terms of 
entrepreneurial capacity and skilled labour 
which Hong Kong receives as a consequence of 
the social transformations taking place in 
China. In the words of Tzong-Biau Lin and 
Yin-Ping Ho: 
"The infrastructure is a legacy of history. 
Hong Kong's hundred years of port activity 
provided the city with an extensive physical 
and commercial infrastructure: harbour and 
warehousing installations, valuable trade links, 
and wide experience in trading. All this, 
together with its efficient banking, insurance 
and sea transport systems, have created an eco-
nomic structure which is extremely suitable for 
the development of export trade in the light 
manufactures which are the fundamental ele-
ment in its present growth. It is perfectly true 
to say that Hong Kong's export industry was 
stimulated in the first place by the great flow of 
labour, capital and entrepreneurs from China 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s. During this 
period, a group of industrialists arrived from 
Shanghai whose capital and entrepreneurial 
capacity immediately brought about an expan-
sion of the textile industry, which spearheaded 
the first stage in the industrialization of Hong 
Kong after the war. Moreover, the big flow of 
immigrants from China—most of them young, 
industrious and skilled— provided a practically 
unl imited number of workers in relation to the 
level of economic activity then existing. Unlike 
most of the economies which have an excess of 
labour, Hong Kong has a labour force which 
^The Financing of Trade and Development in the 
ADCs: The Experience of Singapore. Wong Kum-Poh, Uni-
versity of Singapore, Singapore, 1980, p . 9. Pacific Trade 
and DevelopmentConferenet: . Seoul. 1980. 
does not, as is usually the case, come from the 
agricultural sector, but from immigration."16 
The foregoing indicates that the successful 
industrialization of these two city-States, Hong 
Kong and Singapore, goes far beyond any ques-
tion of being a miraculous result of the applica-
tion of laissez-faire, and confirms the idea that 
in order to understand these processes it is nec-
essary to give due weight to the responsibility 
assumed in them by endogenous groups in a 
form of social organization generated in par-
ticular historical conditions, whose characte-
ristics must not be overlooked. 
The foregoing details regarding the evolu-
tion of protectionist policy in the case of 
Taiwan reflect in turn the existence of a protec-
tionist policy and an industrial strategy well 
defined by the Government ambit, among the 
main results being the relative diversification 
observed in industrial production and exports 
in the course of the period, in which growing 
proportions of products of the chemical, iron 
and steel, and shipbuilding industries are to be 
observed. It would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to try to explain this diversification towards 
capital-intensive sectors (petrochemicals) and 
sectors making intensive use of skilled labour 
and technology (such as shipbuilding) as a 
mere automatic reflection of the system of static 
comparative advantages and pressures by the 
advanced countries, which in actual fact will 
themselves be affected by this industrial diver-
sification of Taiwan. What it is wished to stress 
is that the industrial strategy of Taiwan, as in 
the other cases, is due to a significant extent to 
the political decision of domestic economic 
and social agents which came together in the 
definition of the strategy formulated by the 
State. 
The case of Korea calls for special atten-
tion, since it is the case which has been held up 
perhaps most frequently in Latin America as an 
example of this new paradigm based on open-
ing up to the international market and minimi-
zation of the role of the State. 
In a previous paragraph it was made clear 
K
'Tzong-Biaii Lin and Yin-Ping Ho, Export Oriented 
Growth and Industrial Diversification in Hong Kong, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1980, p. 11. Pacific 
Trade and Development Conference, Seoul, 1980. 
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how far the protectionist policy applied by 
Korea was from the image of it which has been 
projected recently in Latin America. 
A first expression of the active participa-
tion of the public sector in the design of the in-
dustrial strategy is to be seen if we analyse the 
planning scheme put into practice in Korea in 
1962. The first plan (1962-1966) had as its cen-
tral objectives the promotion of the expansion 
of strategic industries, strengthening of the 
economic infrastructure of the country, and 
furthering in particular of the growth of produc-
tivity in the agricultural sector. 
The second plan (1967-1971) concentrated 
on the promotion of the internal articulation of 
the industrial structure and the stimulation of 
industrial exports. 
T h e third plan (1972-1976) had as its cen-
tral objectives the development of the engi-
neer ing industry and heavy industry, as well 
as improvement of the balance-of-payments 
position.17 
In order to illustrate the eminently selec-
tive nature of the industrial strategy and the 
weight exerted by internal decisions in defin-
ing the role which external agents have played 
in the industrialization of Korea, it is worth 
examining the criteria applied in establishing 
rules on the presence of foreign investment. 
T h e sectoral definitions fixed by the Foreign 
Capital Inducement Act to regulate the pres-
ence of foreign investment are detailed below 
(see table 8). 
Apart from its character of sectoral selec-
tivity, direct investment has played quite a 
marginal role compared with external indebt-
edness , and within the latter long-term indebt-
edness has predominated, thus confirming the 
appraisal that this is a case of an industrial de-
velopment strategy propelled by internal 
agents. Except in the two years 1972-1973, 
when direct investment represented 12.3% of 
total long-term credit, its share in the rest of the 
llThe Republic of Korea s Experience..., op. cit.; Trade 
and Industrial Policies..., op. cit.; Honil Lee, Industrial 
Redeployment in Korea, September 1979; Pattern of 
Growth and Changes in Industrial Structure of Korea, 
1953-1973, Hak Chung Choo, Working Paper 7506, Korea 
Development Institute, 1975. 
period 1968-1978 was below 10%, and in 1976-
1978 it went down to 3.3% (see table 9). 
Although no systematic information is 
available on the relative weight offoreign en-
terprises in the industrial sector of these coun-
tries, the indications regarding their share in 
industrial exports suggest that, except in the 
case of Singapore, their relative presence is less 
marked than in Latin America. If we bear in 
mind the fact that in the South-East Asian coun-
tries there has been a definite and well-defined 
policy, as illustrated earlier in the case of 
Korea, of primarily taking advantage of the 
export potential of the foreign enterprises and 
to some extent keeping the domestic market for 
national groups, it may be concluded that the 
share of foreign enterprises in total industrial 
production will tend to be less than the share in 
exports. In Latin America, in contrast, the share 
offoreign enterprises in exports could be a suit-
able approximate measure of their weight in 
total industrial production. 
Bearing in mind these considerations and 
the information given in table 10, it may be 
concluded that the relative importance of 
domestic enterprises in the industrial produc-
tion of Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong is very 
markedly greater than in the semi-industrial-
ized countries of Latin America. This appraisal, 
which differs from the 'popular' image dissemi-
nated in Latin America, indicates perhaps one 
of the special features of the Asian model, 
which, moreover, reaffirm the 'Japanese' inspi-
ration behind their industrial strategy: the 
dominant central influence and leadership of 
the national industrial sector and its duty and 
ability to define strategic options for penetrat-
ing international markets and thus creating, by 
domestic efforts, the 'comparative advantages' 
of the future. This would take us a very long 
way from the kind of model in which countries 
are converted into passive objects of the inter-
national market forces and renounce the inter-
nal creativity and potential for change provid-
ed by the industrial sector. 
The best known expression of the public 
action of the Korean State is the vast and 
generous range of export incentives, especially 
including the following: (i) access to subsid-
ized financing for inputs, fixed investment and 
export activities; (ii) exemption from indirect 
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Table 8 
S O U T H KOREA: SECTORAL REGULATION O F FOREIGN P R E S E N C E 
1. PERMITTED FIELDS 
A. Export industries 
Industries which are required to export their entire produc-
tion, unless the Government permits the contrary: 
(a) Food processing (preparation and preservation of'meat, 
etc.) 
(b) Printing and publishing 
(c) Mining and extraction (mills and associated industries) 
(d) Synthetic resins (plastic materials, plastic films, etc.) 
(e) Glass products (liquor bottles, imitation pearls, etc.) 
(t) Chemical products (colorants and intermediates, zinc 
oxide pigments, etc.) 
(g) Leather products 
(h) Rubber products (bicycle tyres, vee-belts, etc.) 
(i) Chemical fertilizers (urea, compound fertilizers) 
(j) Metal products (door locks, electroplating and gilding) 
(k) Machinery (heaters, bolts, rivets, etc.) 
(1) Photographic and optical articles (optical lenses, spec-
tacles and binoculars) 
(m) Transport equipment (bicycle parts, axles and trans-
missions, etc.) 
(n) Electrical and electronic articles (radio, television, 
video, audio, etc.) 
(o) Furniture 
(p) Others (pianos, organs, etc.) 
(q) Tourism. 
B. Import substitution industries 
Industr ies aimed at replacing imports and, eventually, ex-
porting: 
(a) Hand made fibres (viscose and rayon fibres) 
(b) Paper and paper products (chemical pulp) 
(c) Chemical products (ethylene glycol, paper for films 
and sensitive paper) 
(d) Basic metals (iron and steel castings, etc.) 
(e) Metal products (drums, special electroplating, etc.) 
(f) Machinery (water turbiness, gasoline motors, etc.) 
(g) Electricity and electronics (electric motors, generators, 
etc.) 
(h) Transport (marine engines, building of metal ships, 
etc.) 
2. RESTRICTED FIELDS 
A. Prohibited by law in the public interest 
(a) Cigars 
(b) Processing 
(c) Water supply 
(d) Companies established with the Japanese repatriation 
fund 
Restricted by law 
(a) Mining 
(b) Aviation 
(c) Fishing and processing 
(d) Maritime transport 
Prohibited under the industrial policy 
(a) Generat ing plants and distribution 
(b) Railways 
(c) Gas supply 
(d) Coastal fishing 
Prohibited in order to protect domestic enterprises 




(a) Silk fabrics and tsumugi finishes 
(b) Non-woven fabrics 
(c) Kimonos and finishes 
(d) Special fabrics and finishes 
(e) Colorants and finishes 
Metal products 
(a) Farm implements 
Iron and steel 





(a) Automobile motors 
(b) Motor parts 
(c) Brake system 
(d) Clutch system 
(e) Electrical articles 
Transport and storage 
Warehouses 
Table 9 
SOUTH KOREA: LONG-TERM FINANCIAL MOVEMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
N e t long-term 
capital 



















































































































Source: Park Yung-Chul, Export Growth and the Balance of Payments in Korea, 1960-1978, Korea University, 1980, p. 6. 
"Includes frozen loans, commitments to international organizations, fund covering transactions between head offices and foreign branches, bank 
deposits, and advance payments for imports. 
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Table 10 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SHARE OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS IN EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES 
Country Approximate percentages Year 
Total exports of 
manufactures in 1972 










At least 20% 




At least 30% 

















Source: Deepak Navvers, "Transnational Corporations and Manufactured Exports from Poor Countries", in Economic 
Journal, Vol. 88, March 1978, p. 62. 
taxes for intermediate products and foreign sa-
les; (iii) exemption from duties on direct, indir-
ect and capital goods inputs intended for export 
activities; (iv) reduction of direct taxes on in-
come generated by export activities in favour of 
a reserve created from taxable income for the 
development of external markets and for com-
pensat ing export losses and accelerated depre-
ciation schemes used in connexion with 
de termined export activities; (v) authorization 
to import goods not normally permitted, in so 
far as these are connected with export activi-
ties; and (vi) preferential tariffs for energy and 
transport. Outstanding among this set of incen-
tives are the financing at subsidized rates and 
the preferential tax system which are those of 
greatest significance in the growth of exports. 
T h e s e two instruments, apart from their impor-
tance for promoting exports, are a clear expres-
sion of the non-neutral character of the Korean 
State and its close articulation with the indus-
trial entrepreneurial sectors. 
T h e following estimates show the quanti-
tative importance of this financial subsidy: the 
proportion of subsidies associated with inter-
nal and external credits for the manufacturing 
sector and the stock of fixed capital in the ma-
nufacturing sector was 4% in the period 1950-
1961 and 6% between 1962 and 1966, but 
be tween 1967 and 1971 this proportion rose to 
14%, and from 1972 onwards it attained the 
level of 25%. 
If we examine the proportion between the 
subsidies and gross fixed capital formation, we 
note an increase of 40% between 1962 and 
1966, 75% between 1967 and 1971, and over 
100% after 1972. 
At the same time, we observe that the real 
rate of return in the manufacturing sector, 
which was estimated at 9% in the period 1950-
1961, rose to 17% between 1962 and 1966,26% 
be tween 1967 and 1971 and around 27% be-
tween 1972 and 1976.!fi 
The increase in the rate of return in the 
industrial sector, together with the rise in real 
wages at an annual rate of 8.7% between 1963 
and 1971 and 11.1% between 1972 and 1978,iy 
was possible because of the rapid growth of 
productivity which accompanied this extraor-
dinary rate of expansion 'spearheaded' by the 
industrial sector. 
In spite of this significant increase in real 
wages, the share of labour income, including 
income of small enterprises, in the gross natio-
18Wontack Hong, Trade, Industrial Growth and In-
come Distribution in Korea, Seoul University, 1980, pp. 
25-26. Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Seoul, 
1980. 
mbid.,p.4l. 
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nal product shows a decline from 85% in 1963 
to 78% in 1975. At the same time, the share of 
entrepreneurial income in the product rose 
from 6.4% in 1963 to 10.9% in 1975.2() With 
regard to the connexion between the export 
policy and this regressive distribution of inco-
me, Wontack Hong concludes that the main 
explanations are as follows: 
"Firstly, the fact that export activities en-
joyed big subsidies means that a considerable 
rent must have been created for those persons 
with special entrepreneurial talent and capac-
ity for expanding exports. Secondly, the fact 
that the Government restricted the assignment 
of subsidies to a limited number of entrepre-
neurs in order to take advantage of economies 
of scale also means concentration of wealth, 
whi le the preferential tax system aimed at giv-
ing incentives to entrepreneurs to retain and 
reinvest profits, together with the insignificant 
level of the inheritance taxes levied, means the 
perpetuation of this concentration of wealth. 
Since in the 1970s approximately 25% of total 
government expenditure was devoted to gene-
ral administration, 30% to defence, 25% to in-
vestment activities aimed at economic growth, 
and the rest to social development expenses 
(principally primary education), it may be said 
it has never been the Korean Government's aim 
to improve income distribution or increase 
public welfare activities on the basis of a 
system of taxes and fiscal expenditures. In 
other words, if economic factors such as the 
growing proportion of income in respect of 
profits have accentuated the deterioration of 
income distribution in the 1970s, the system of 
taxes and government spending has never em-
barked on any new efforts to reverse this 
trend."2 1 
In the cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong too, 
for which information is available, we note an 
increase in real wages in spite of the weak trade 
union activity. In the case of Hong Kong, the 
Government does not apply any regulations re-
a'Table 10. 
2íTrade, Industrial Growth..., op. cit., p. 3. 
garding minimun wages, and trade union activ-
ity appears to be extremely sketchy.22 
With regard to Korea, the well-known 
study by Westphal notes: 
"Where the government has intervened in 
labour markets it has generally been to counter 
organized labour force which as a result is not a 
powerful interest group."23 
In Taiwan the unit cost of labour appears to 
have remained constant or even gone down in 
the 1960s, beginning to grow in the following 
decade.24 
Although no precise information is avail-
able, it may be assumed that in view of the 
indexes of growth of productivity in Taiwan a 
similar phenomenon took place there to that 
observed in Korea, where the growth of real 
wages and regressive income distribution took 
place side by side. From the point of view of 
social tensions, even leaving aside the question 
of the machinery of repression, concentration 
of income parallel with growth of real wages 
against a background of generalized expecta-
tions of economic growth is absorbed relatively 
easily. The situation changes, however, when 
(as appears to have taken place in Korea in the 
second half of the 1960s) a situation of full em-
ployment is reached while at the same time the 
prospects for growth deteriorate. The simulta-
neous existence of a slowly growing external 
market, pressures due to growing trade union 
activity and the coming to the surface of the 
social problems accumulated and kept covered 
up during the period of growth probably go a 
long way towards explaining the political 
conflicts observed in Korea in recentyears. The 
topic of the effects caused by the entry of this 
long cycle of expansion into the recessive 
phase will be resumed when we analyse the 
international context in which the industrializ-
ing entrepreneurial action of the State took pla-
ce in these countries. 
^Export Oriented growth, op. cit., p. 9. 
23T/te Republic of Korea's Experience, op. cit., p. 375. 
'^Trade Strategy and the Exchange Rate..., op. cit., 
p. 41. 
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VI 
The international context 
In previous paragraphs stress has been laid on a 
set of internal factors which appear to have 
played a determining role in the rapid eco-
nomic growth experienced by these countries 
after the war: the industrialization effort of the 
State, expressed through the subordination of 
the financial sphere to the objective of indus-
trial growth; the definition of sectoral priorities 
and integral economic policies in support of the 
selected branches; the clear articulation with 
an enterpreneurial sector having the will and 
desire to secure industrialization; the passive 
at t i tude of the labour force and the fragility of 
trade union organizations, which is explained 
both by political and repressive factors and by 
the high density of population with low pro-
ductivity in the initial stages; and the design 
and clear utilization of a massive policy of train-
ing labour. In the cases of the city-States of 
Hong Kong and Singapore, this industrializa-
tion was complemented with the traditional en-
trepreneurial competence and experience in 
the fields of trade and finance. 
These internal factors were strengthened 
and stimulated by a certain international 
context, while both economic and geopolitical 
considerations acted in the direction of decid-
edly strengthening industrial growth oriented 
towards international markets. 
In the economic field, we have seen in a 
study25 referred to earlier how the rapid growth 
which was a feature of the period after the war 
favoured the accelerated growth of productiv-
ity, intensification of international trade, and 
consequently also of competition between the 
developed countries, which in its turn had pro-
jections on the internationalization of indus-
trial production, with a progressive increase in 
the relative expensiveness of labour which 
st imulated the search for elements to neutral-
ize that tendency, among them the construction 
of export platforms in countries with cheap and 
25Fajnzylber, The Industrial Dynamic..., op. cit. 
'disciplined' labour. This factor of "demand" 
then encountered a functional response in the 
internal factors of the Asian NICs, whose endo-
genous dynamism found a propitious field in 
the markets of the developed countries and es-
pecially the United States and Europe. This 
was a period during which trade was liberal-
ized, principally in the tariff field, and where 
GATT did not really worry too much about the 
export subsidy policies applied in the develop-
ing countries, or the measures of protection in 
specific sectors. The intensification of competi-
tion between developed countries, the in-
crease in the cost of labour in those countries, 
and the generation of forms of marketing 
through big chains of supermarkets found a 
strictly functional response in the efforts of the 
Asian countries to industrialize and export, and 
their concentration on consumer goods. At the 
same time, the profound industrial changes 
going on in Japan, which permitted it to bring 
about drastic changes in its industrial and ex-
port structure, moving from labour-intensive 
products to products making intensive use of 
technology and capital, found in the expansion 
of the Asian countries an expedient to permit it 
to offset its loss of competitiveness in labour-
intensive products, by channelling to those 
countries the capital goods required for their 
domestic and export-oriented industrial growth. 
The considerations of an economic nature 
which apply to the developing countries in ge-
neral were accompanied, in the case of the 
Asian countries, by considerations of a geopoli-
tical nature. Thus, for well-known geograph-
ical and historical reasons this group of coun-
tries played an important role in the ideological 
and military confrontation between East and 
West in the period following the war. In addi-
tion to the strictly logistic aspects connected 
with the existence of military bases, the eco-
nomic and military strengthening of these 
countries also became an essential objective. 
In the confrontation with China, a decisive role 
was played by Taiwan and Hong Kong, and to a 
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less extent Singapore, while in the case of the 
confrontation with North Korea and the Viet-
nam conflict an important role was played by 
South Korea. 
In the cases of both Taiwan and Korea the 
economic aid provided during the 1960s play-
ed an important function in that it provided a 
sound basis in the critical phase of the gestation 
of these industrialization models. As already 
noted, the trade deficit in the 1950s and the 
early 1960s reached a considerable level, and it 
was precisely at this time that United States aid 
carried out a decisive function: 
"Taiwan was the beneficiary of a strong aid 
programme. It was assigned a total of US$ 1444 
million in the period between 1951 and 1965, 
which is equivalent to ten dollars per inhabi-
tant per year. This assistance played an impor-
tant role in the task of controlling inflation at 
the beginning of the 1950s. Moreover, if it had 
not been for United States aid, the trade deficit 
of Taiwan would have been a factor capable of 
seriously limiting the country's economic de-
velopment up to the early 1960s. United States 
aid overcame this bottleneck by increasing the 
foreign exchange resources and providing sup-
port for the importation of indispensable inputs 
which served as a complement to the domestic 
labour force and other components of invest-
ment . Up to 1951, the share of United States aid 
imports in total imports remained over 30%, 
although subsequently it went down ra-
pidly."2 6 
With regard to Korea, a similar situation 
was observed: 
"Korea's relationship with the United 
States obviously increased its foreign exchange 
earnings through expenditures stemming from 
the stationing of UN forces in Korea and, during 
the war in Vietnam, from offshore procurement 
by the United States. As indicated in table 6 
unde r 'receipts from government transactions', 
militarily related expenditures (the sum of the 
two components shown) in the past accounted 
for a sizable fraction of Korea's foreign ex-
change earnings."27 
The same author, in setting out the con-
clusions of his well-known study, highlights 
mbid., p. 3. 
21 The Republic of Korea's Experience, op. cit., p, 361. 
the endogenous elements among the comple-
mentary factors: 
"The most obvious element was the level 
of foreign assistance during the 1950s and early 
1960s, which contributed to building the infra-
structure for subsequent growth."28 
Another analysis of the balance-of-pay-
ments situation of Korea states: 
"From the early 1950s, after the Korean 
War, until the mid-1960s, the trade deficit, in-
cluding invisible items, was generally covered 
through foreign aid and donations. In this pe-
riod the inflow of capital, whether short or long 
term, was very slight."29 
As regards the geopolitical importance of 
these countries and its connexion with the field 
of trade, it may be of interest to quote a state-
ment regarding Hong Kong which says: 
"One of the reasons why the United States 
did not try to apply more pressure to Hong 
Kong during the 1960s with regard to limita-
tions in the question of textiles was that the 
United States needed the intelligence station 
which was used to keep the People's Republic 
of China under surveillance.' ,3° 
The economic and geopolitical considera-
tions which tended to favour the policy of ex-
port industrialization of these countries are 
illustrated by the many cases of leniency with 
which the United States applied trade regula-
tions to these countries. Thus, in the specific 
field of the application of customs classifica-
tions, the most noteworthy example are those 
connected with cases of classification of shoes 
as rubber shoes or non-rubber shoes, yarn as 
cotton yarn or synthetic yarn, and television 
sets as assembled or semi-assembled: all op-
tions with decisive tariff implications. 
By way of illustration, let us take the case of 
footwear: 
mbid., p.375. 
2i,Park Yung-Chill, Export Growth and the Balance of 
Payments in Korea, 1960-1978, Korea University, 1980, 
p. 3. Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Seoul, 
1980. 
3( )D. Yof'fie and R. Keohane, Responding to the 'New 
Protectionism': Strategies for the Advanced Developing 
Countries of the Pacific Basin, Stanford University, United 
States, 1980, p. 12. Pacific Trade and Development Confe-
rence, Seoul, 1980. 
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" In 1976 the Koreans exported to the 
United States 44 million pairs of non-rubber 
shoes and stated in January 1977 that their total 
export capacity for the year was 60 million 
pairs. T h e United States tried to lower the total 
achieved by Korea in 1976 and in fact reduced 
the level of the Korean quota to 33 million pairs 
for the year ending in June 1978. Using the 
various clauses that permitted greater flexibili-
ty, however, the Koreans actually managed to 
export 58 million pairs of shoes in 1977."3l 
There are also many examples of leniency 
on the part of the United States towards the 
Asian countries with regard to the evasion of 
valid regulations. An important case is that of 
transshipment, which seems to be particularly 
significant in the textile and footwear sectors: 
"With regard to textiles, clothing and foot-
wear, the classic way of getting round the quota 
has been transshipment. Buying false docu-
ments in Hong Kong, for example, costs only 
one-third of the amount that it would cost to 
acquire legitimate quotas. The goods can then 
be transported in bulk to Indonesia or Sri 
Lanka, which have no quotas, and can be newly 
labelled before being sent on to the United 
States. Transshipment immediately became 
much in evidence after the application of the 
measures regarding footwear. Taiwan compa-
nies sent footwear components to Hong Kong 
to be assembled there, with the result that 
Hong Kong's exports of footwear increased by 
22 .5%in l978 . " 3 2 
Another way of evading established trade 
regulations is the use of third countries to neu-
tralize the restrictions specifically placed on 
certain suppliers: 
"As they no longer have the opportunity to 
export synthetic textiles instead of cotton be-
cause of the negotiation of the multifibres 
agreements , Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong ha-
bitually export batches of such textile to coun-
tries like the Philippines or even Japan, where 
the work of manufacture is completed and the 
products are then sent to the United States."33 
The considerations of an economic and 
geopolitical nature already mentioned appear 
^¡bid.,y>. 15. 
•Klbid., p. 17. 
33/fcii/., p. 18. 
to have played a significant role in the relative 
indifference shown by the United States in ac-
cepting these situations: 
"In many cases, the evasion of customs 
regulations was encouraged or tacitly approved 
by the United States. At one stage of the Viet-
nam war, larger shipments than those permit-
ted were easily accepted, because domestic 
production was less than demand. The fact of 
allowing certain provisions to be evaded may 
have satisfied some of the legitimate com-
plaints of countries subject to restrictions, 
while at the same time maintaining the integri-
ty of the protectionist régime. Moreover, the 
United States has never put into practice an 
effective system of sanctions. The highest 
amount paid by an importer for illegally in-
fringing a quota is US$ 10 000, which is not a 
very important sum compared with the poten-
tial profits."34 
The importance of this international con-
text in explaining the 'Asian miracle' became 
evident precisely when, in the 1970s, this inter-
national context underwent changes. The re-
cession in the developed world was project-
ed directly into the sphere of international 
trade, not only through the emergence of pro-
tectionist tendencies in certain countries, but 
also through the content of the international 
trade negotiations in GATT. From the early 
1970s onwards, there began to be concern over 
export subsidies, protection policies, 'public 
sector purchasing mechanisms' as an element 
of domestic protection, and in more general 
terms, the need for the NICs —among whom 
the leading role was played by the Asian coun-
tries— to grant reciprocity to the developed 
countries in trade relations, which mainly af-
fected export subsidies and protection of the 
domestic market. During these years, the main 
instruments of this 'protectionism' formulated 
by the developed countries were the 'voluntary 
export restraints' (VER) and the 'orderly mar-
keting agreements ' (OMA), intended mainly to 
get round the most-favoured-nation clause. 
The VER became so widespread that they now 
have an importance comparable with that of 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions.35 
M Ibid-, p. 19. 
*
5Ibid., p. 2. 
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According to the International Monetary 
Fund , the developed countries have establish-
ed more than 30 restrictive measures against 
Taiwan since 1976, while Korea has been af-
fected by over 70 such actions since the begin-
ning of the 1970s.3fi This new external picture 
could hardly fail to have serious effects on the 
economic situation in countries where exports 
represented a high proportion of their activ-
ities. This external factor was strengthened by 
the increase in power of the trade unions and 
their corresponding political expressions 
within the Asian countries, where, precisely 
because of the rapid growth of industry and the 
increase in the level of skill of the labour force 
and the relative scarcity of the latter, social 
changes were taking place which modified one 
of the main internal elements explaining the 
previous model. 
In the field of geopolitical relations, the 
United States' new relationship with China 
also significantly modified the importance of 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The new 
international position of China probably also 
had some influence on the policy of North 
Korea towards South Korea, and perhaps the 
references to unification are not totally uncon-
nected with the new framework of relations 
be tween the United States and China and 
Japan and China. 
Consequently, the convergence of the 
changes taking place in the international eco-
nomic and political framework and the internal 
social changes brought about precisely by prior 
economic growth explain the political and eco-
nomic difficulties facing these countries, par-
ticularly Korea, which is the country which had 
progressed furthest in the diversification of its 
industrial structure. The present government 
has undertaken, precisely in the metal manu-
factures and machinery sector, a process of 
industrial restructuring designed to promote 
mergers of firms and avoid over-investment in 
the sector. The four enterprises which operated 
in the heavy electrical equipment sector are 
being regrouped under only one of them, while 
another of the leading groups has been forced 
36B. Nowzod, The Rise of Protectionism, IMF, 1978, 
p. 108. Cited in Ibid., p. 24. 
to choose between the capital goods and the 
automobile sector and has finally decided on 
the latter. The drop in domestic demand has 
also had very severe repercussions on the 
automobile sector, and it is estimated that 
exports of vehicles fell by 70% in 1980. 
The same situation is to be observed in the. 
electronic products sector, where the four big-
gest enterprises all declared losses in the first 
half of 1980. In this sector, whose main exports 
are black and white television sets, semicon-
ductors and telephone exchanges, and more 
recently colour television sets, the restrictions 
on international markets have coincided with a 
drop in the domestic market. It is interesting to 
note that for reasons connected with the stimu-
lation of domestic savings, up to this year the 
Korean Government had prohibited the sale of 
colour television sets on the domestic market, 
but because of the restrictions on the interna-
tional market it has now thrown open the do-
mestic market to local manufacturers.37 
This restriction on the domestic consump-
tion of colour television sets produced by do-
mestic firms, together with the considerations 
which inspired it, confirms the industrializing 
propensity of the State and provides an inter-
esting contrast with those countries of Latin 
America where, because of the predominance 
of a mercantile and financial intermediation 
mentality, domestic production has been re-
placed by imports coming partly from South-
East Asia. As this is a sector which, like that of 
electronics, constitutes one of the decisive fac-
tors in the creation of the 'future comparative 
advantages', it may be foreseen that this 'mod-
ernization by imports' could have by no means 
insignificant consequences for the place of 
these countries in the international market in 
the next decade. 
Concern over the economic situation of 
Korea —a country whose creditworthiness in 
the international financial system was previ-
ously unsurpassed— has even reached the 
spheres of the World Bank, a body whose re-
ports up to now had helped to convert the 
Korean model into a veritable paradigm and 
37E. Lochica and J. Landauer, "South Korea has seri-
ous economic ills, confidential study for World Bank says", 
in The Wall Street Journal, 23 December 1980. 
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whose financial contribution to Korea, al-
though not of large size, was important for its 
catalytic function with respect to the private 
banks, as also happened in the case of the other 
developing countries : 
"South Korea is in serious economic dif-
ficulties: the rate of exports achieved in 
previous years has gone down, and no solution 
has yet been found for inflation and unemploy-
ment , according to confidential World Bank 
documents . These studies, prepared by loan 
officials of the Bank, draw a picture of this pre-
viously so vigorous Asian country which is 
more sombre than those accepted up to now by 
its officials and United States banks. The 
Uni ted States has vital interests in South Korea 
not only because of its strategic location in 
North-East Asia, but also because it'occupies 
T h e foregoing considerations show how pre-
carious 'paradigms' can be which are based 
fundamentally on economic indicators and do 
not take into account cultural, institutional and 
social factors or the link between endogenous 
factors and the international context. This in no 
way rules out or minimizes the importance of 
the lessons that can be learned in the specific 
field of economic policy and industrial strategy 
from the cases considered, but it does empha-
size the 'scientific' fragility of recommenda-
tions which advocate the mechanical transfer 
be tween countries of experiences which have 
not even been carefully interpreted. Even 
more serious is the case of those recommenda-
tions which, apart from failing to take account 
of the economic and social conditions of the 
recipient country of the experience, distort the 
lessons that can be drawn from the experiences 
on which they are based. In the case of the 
countries of South-East Asia, it is a serious 
omission not to give sufficient emphasis to the 
following: 
(i) The existence of a set of endogenous 
factors which help to explain the specific fea-
twelfth place among the countries with the 
highest trade links with the United States... 
The harsh and arbitrary policies of the gov-
ernment, combined with the contained resent-
ment of the lower sectors, do not seem specially 
favourable to economic growth, but there is a 
small possibility that a broad and ambitious 
policy of industrial restructuring combined 
with an improvement in international trade, 
would make it possible for Korea to get over its 
economic difficulties and thus avoid the danger 
of a political crisis..."38 
The subsequent evolution of the Korean 
model will be largely linked to the evolution of 
the world economy and the political capacity of 
the régime to absorb the social tensions which 
had been neutralized and postponed by what 
seemed to be unlimited growth. 
tures of this industrialization which took place 
at an even later date than that observed in Latin 
America. 
(ii) The existence of a national entrepre-
neurial nucleus endowed with a marked indus-
trialization mission. 
(iii) The traditional competence of national 
groups in the fields of international trade and 
finance, particularly in Hong Kong and Singa-
pore. 
(iv) The presence of a public sector capa-
ble of conceiving and implementing a long-
term industrialization strategy. 
(v) The careful, selective and lucid policy 
of protecting the formative period of national 
industry. 
(vi) The subordination of the financial di-
mension to the strategic objective of industrial-
ization. 
fvii) The special attention and protection 
given to the agricultural sector. 
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that observed in Latin America, of foreign 
enterprises (except in Singapore) and, what is 
perhaps more important, the subordination of 
their behaviour to domestically defined strate-
gic industrial objectives. 
(ix) The politically authoritarian nature of 
their regimes, particularly in Korea and Tai-
wan. 
(x) The special nature of the international 
context in which these experiences took place. 
